Backward Reference and Forward Referring Anticipations:
Husserl’s Limits of Language

Prasenjit Biswas
North-Eastern Hill University, Shillong

Husserl’s formulation that single-rayed nominal presentations ‘refer back’ to multi-rayed predicative interpretations open up the possibility of differently intended senses that is actualized in ‘complete presentation of the one and same object’. In Husserl’s exemplication, “S is P” where the nominal presentation S refers back to an adequation of ‘what is’, which is ‘P’.  But P is a multi-rayed predicate with differently interpreted senses that carry the intentionality to bring an end to interpretation, that is, to find out which object fulfils the intended sense.  In order to fulfil the intended sense, the objects has to be self-evidently present. Husserl follows a logic of ‘non-oversteppable’ last goal of interpretation, which leads toward an ideal end-point as a limit to possibility of interpretation. Interpretation as a self-propelling act of consciousness requires an intuitive fulfilment that requires to refer back to ‘simple judgments’ or immediate ‘one time fulfillment’. This is potentially a limiting condition on infinite one-sided perspective on the world that refers back to its already constituted sense and its fulfilment by moving from objects to predications of the same objects by an act of previous interpretation. For Husserl interpretations are worldless and limitless, but they lead to meaning intentions freeing themselves from their signified contents that otherwise belong to them.

While the paper largely concurs with Husserl’s idea of referring back to previous meaning intentions yet it emphasizes and explores forward referring anticipations of unnameable objects and unanticipatable contexts of new intended objects that elude intended sense of the world. In terms of nature of linguistic constitution of the world, limits of language no longer bring an end to the world that is the subject of interpretation, rather limits only refer back in order to develop new ‘forward-referring anticipations’.